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Abstract: The application and design of public-private partnerships between the ex-
tremes of purely public or purely private task fulfilment in public services is, in practice, 
subject to political processes. Decisions about PPPs (realisation, arrangement) are taken 
in the political arena and are therefore not theoretical optimisation exercises. The inter-
ests and resources of the actors who participate in the political decision-making process 
as well as the rules of the political process have a powerful influence on whether, in 
what areas, and in what form PPPs are realised. The distance between this output and 
solutions that are theoretically desirable given certain ideal goals (e.g. efficiency) and 
conditions can be referred to as political bias. So what role does the political process 
play in the realisation of PPPs, in the actual design of PPPs, and in their performance? 
Using public choice and institutional economics theory this paper analyses what chanc-
es of success PPPs have given the existing decision-making structures and the inherent 
incentives for participating actors, and in what way political influence is brought to 
bear in the first place. Furthermore, aspects of political science in this field (legitimacy, 
democratic control) are considered as well. Using PPPs there might be a trade-off be-
tween reduced democratic control, but also reinforced market control. It turns out that 
political involvement might be both an important driver as well as an obstacle for (effi-
cient) PPPs and that it is likely to decrease efficiency either way. A case study for user-
financing PPPs in the transport sector highlights the problems of political renitency. 
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Political drivers of and barriers to Public-Private Partner-
ships: The role of political involvement 
 
1. Introduction 
The design of meaningful and successful models of cooperation between the extremes 
of purely public or purely private task fulfilment is, in practice, more than just the solu-
tion to a theoretical optimisation problem where the particular institutional arrangement 
that promises the best possible (e.g. most “efficient”) solution prevails. Even if societal 
agreement were to exist on this matter, whether political decisions on Public-Private 
Partnership  (PPP)  solutions  are,  in  practice,  aligned  along  these  very  criteria,  what 
chances of success PPPs have given the existing decision-making structures and the in-
herent incentives for participating actors, and in what way political influence is brought 
to bear in the first place are questions that would still arise. So what role does the polit-
ical process play in the realisation of PPPs, in the actual design of PPPs, and in their 
performance? 
Central to this problem is a viewpoint from which the public sector does not appear as 
some sort of fictive unit solely dedicated to pursuing the public interest. Rather this pub-
lic sector is disintegrating into a system with various actors, each pursuing self-interests 
(Wettenhall 2003: 93 ff.). This is the Public Choice perspective (Mueller 2005). Taken 
from this point of view actors in the public sphere are also individuals who are constant-
ly guided by their own interests – as “political entrepreneurs”, as bureaucrats, as voters 
or as representatives of interest groups. The political output depends on the one hand 
on these particularist interests and on the other hand on the institutional circumstances 
in which they are co-ordinated and implemented, e.g. via voting markets, the influence 
of  interest  groups,  budget  regulations  or  publicity  through  transparency  in  decision-
making procedures. Decisions on framework conditions and thus the chances of success 
of PPP arrangements are also made within the scope of a complex political process. 
This process cannot be simply expected to generate exactly the proper scope of gov-
ernment (Knight 2001) or the optimal institutional regulations in terms of the public, pri-
vate or hybrid provision of goods and services that would maximise the welfare of soci-
ety as a whole (Välilä 2005). However, if a significant political bias does exist, it is 
worth considering more closely in the following, also in terms of PPP solutions. 
The political system is involved in the formation, design, implementation and perfor-
mance of PPP solutions in a variety of ways: 
– Politically, first a decision is made on the institutional framework within which public 
but also private sector provision of goods must be organised. At the same time this 
framework determines the extent to which PPPs make it possible to serve individual 
interests. The political framework for alternative allocation procedures and the ap-
peal of certain decisions is defined through rules on the public budget, the possibili-
ties of public financing via taxes or debt, as well as the institutional possibilities for 
democratic control. Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    4 
– The political system also turns out to be a potential driver of PPP solutions: As long as 
PPP arrangements serve the specific interests of political decision-makers better than 
conventional public services a political suction effect will arise. At the same time, un-
der certain circumstances political involvement can also turn out to be a barrier, 
namely when – despite economic advantages – the political net costs are estimated 
to be higher than the economic net gain.  
– Finally, the relevance of the political system leads to expectations of very specific 
arrangements and results from the realisation of permitted PPP solutions. Arrange-
ments with a special political problem-solving competence and which do not maxim-
ise the common good might be in demand here.  
This is connected to central economic and political problems:  
– The most interesting aspects from an economic perspective are the incentives for the 
political actors and the political bias vis-à-vis economically efficient solutions (Müh-
lenkamp 2006): What makes PPPs attractive to political actors and what output is to 
be expected against this background, particularly in terms of efficiency?  
– Of primary importance from a political science perspective is how “co-operative” 
partnerships between public and private actors, in comparison with the purely pub-
lic execution of tasks, bring forth new and different forms of statehood, which should 
be assessed in terms of legitimacy, political control and transparency (Grande/Pauly 
2005). 
To examine these questions we will first take a closer look at the political drivers of PPP 
(section 2): From where do PPP arrangements draw their appeal? What can – with ref-
erence to the economic theory of politics – explain their growing popularity in practice? 
In section 3 the political influence on the concrete design of PPP arrangements is inves-
tigated in detail with the aid of new institutional economics. Section 4 goes on to deal 
with the social dimension of PPP solutions through modified decision-making structures 
and their legitimation. Then, using the case example of user-financed PPP services, such 
as in the concession model, political involvement will be depicted as a stumbling block 
that can hinder even efficient projects (section 5). Final remarks are presented in section 
6. 
 
2. Political Drivers of PPP 
2.1 Overview 
What is seen as the new element in the current PPP discourse is not so much the long-
observed co-operation between public and private actors, but above all – next to the 
meanwhile stronger (legal) institutionalisation of PPPs – the increased public demand 
for this political instrument (Krumm/Mause 2009). This increased demand is unlikely 
to  be  attributable  to  the  objective  superiority  of  PPPs,  especially  since  empirical 
(Hodge/Greve 2009; Obermann 2007; Greiling 2009) and theoretical studies (Beck-
ers/Klatt 2008) would suggest that they are highly controversial.  Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    5 
In fact, the political preferability of public-private mixed forms of task fulfillment is more 
a result of the following two dimensions (Fig. 1): 
– the specific political problem-solving competence of PPPs for handling the current 
challenges of the public sector (2.2),  
– the special serving of particularist interests of the decision-makers involved in the po-
litical process (2.3). 
 
2.2 Meeting public sector challenges 
First, PPP approaches can succeed in meeting some of the current challenges faced by 
the public sector (Budäus 2004). These include 
– the significance of PPPs for the general reform of public administration: With the use 
of PPPs the public sector is directly confronted with new management instruments 
and procedures (Schedler/Proeller 2006). The joint performance of tasks requires a 
change in thinking in public administrations from previously more heavily bureau-
cratic structures to management concepts in the sense of New Public Management 
and the economisation of the administration (Bogumil 2004; Mezger/Schneider 
2006); 
– the role of PPPs as an instrument for coping with increasing international competition 
and in particular the EU competition concept. This means that classical public task 
areas that previously fell under “services of general interest” with monopolistic sup-
ply structures are now exposed to competition. These include the field of telecom-
munications, energy supply, public transport, as well as a range of other task areas 
currently under discussion (e.g. water supply) (Schneider/Janning 2006). Particular-
ly at municipal level the classical providers of supply and disposal services have to 
adjust to this competition with entirely new strategies. Meanwhile the incorporation 
of private partners into publicly owned companies with their classical supply mo-
nopoly has become indispensable in a wide range of areas. Here Schnei-
der/Janning (2006: 110) see a dominant influence of “action-guiding ideologies” 
at work in privatisation and competition, which favours PPPs; 
– the position of PPPs against the backdrop of ongoing fundamental change in public 
administration’s understanding of its function and role: Here we are talking about 
the transition from a producing to a guaranteeing state. State and public administra-
tion should no longer themselves be primarily responsible for the production and 
provision of public services, rather they should only guarantee that the respective 
tasks are carried out. The problem of determining the “optimal service level” posed 
by the New Public Management movement (Naschold 1996; Schedler/Proeller: 
2006: 207 ff.) is linked to the fundamental discussion being conducted between po-
litical, legal, administration and economic scientists by the question of which areas 
the state is “ultimately responsible” for or has a “guaranteeing” function to fulfil 
(Reichard 2004; Genschel/Zangl 2007; Heidbrink/Hirsch 2007).  
So  reforms  are  politically  successful  when  policy-makers  manage  “to  create  user-
friendly blueprints that embrace existing schemata” (Isaak 1999). As long as PPPs pro-Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    6 
vide the right starting points for this, they promise a political added value that facili-
tates their implementation.  
 
2.3 Individual interests and PPP 
2.3.1 The private sector 
In addition, PPP solutions serve important individual interests of participants in the deci-
sion-making process. This applies primarily to the stakeholder groups of the private 
actors taking part in the PPP: Here underemployment and resource availability in the 
private-enterprise sector count as important private drivers. One example of this is un-
derutilisation in the construction industry,  which as a specific  stakeholder played a 
strong role in initiating the debate on PPPs. Furthermore, due to the innovation content 
and the high level of coordination required within the scope of PPP solutions, accom-
panying “interaction management” by business consultants and lawyers is a lucrative 
business segment (Sack 2009) which could develop its own dynamic if supposedly 
“neutral” advisors pursue income interests.  
2.3.2 Political entrepreneurs 
In the public sector, on the other hand, the interests of political entrepreneurs play a 
central role: Politicians’ interest in satisfying the demand for public services in a vote-
winning way outside the constraints of the public budget is deemed in the literature to 
be the ultimate political driver (Bennett/DiLorenzo 1982; 1983; Bennett 2004; Müh-
lenkamp 2010; de Vries 2011): The financial crisis of the modern tax state brings forth 
the innovation of the PPP, not because it could succeed in efficiently redefining the 
proper scope of government, but because it can minimise the political costs of govern-
ment spending.  
With conventional realisation the unbridled demand for public expenditure would have 
to be financed through budget expansion, either through additional tax burdens or 
additional debt. But for institutional, and also for economic reasons, both are increas-
ingly being pushed to their limits. Debt, in particular, is at the centre of attention: Politi-
cally, “debt is favored because repayment occurs in the future (perhaps when others 
are in office) while the benefits of the expenditures are reaped in the present period” 
(Bennett 2004: 587). However if growing debt is limited by institutional regulations 
(“debt brakes”) or sanctioned by markets (“debt crisis”) then against this background 
PPP appears to be an effective way “to move government activities ‘off the books’ or 
‘underground’ by creating an ‘off-budget’ public sector” (Bennett 2004: 587). Its fi-
nancial operations are not subject to statutory or constitutional constraints. Hence they 
“offer politicians greater opportunities for nepotism and favoritism in rewarding their 
supporters than do on-budget government agencies where freedom-of-information legis-
lation typically mandates an openness and transparency from which off-budget enter-
prises are exempted as ‘private’ corporations” (ibid: 588). 
In the funding crisis of the modern tax state (continuously growing demands on the state 
with increasingly noticeable limits on the income side) PPP appears to point to comfort-
able ways out: PPP is seen as a tool for tapping into private capital for the realisation of Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    7 
public tasks without formally increasing debt. The sustained financial crisis of the re-
gional  authorities  is  therefore  rightly  seen  as  a  key  driver  of  PPP  solutions.  Budäus 
(2006: 14) even talks of a “coercion to co-operate with private enterprises to per-
form public tasks”. This is problematic if and as far as “underground government and 
off-the-books operations are prominent features of the political landscape that benefit 
politicians more than their constituents” (Bennett 2004: 589). 
Instead, the efficiency of political spending decisions could be strengthened, for exam-
ple in a system that relies more on the benefit principle on the income side than on the 
abilty-to-pay principle of general tax financing (Hansjürgens 1998). In this case, as an 
institutional innovation, the PPP potentially only threatens to perpetuate the economic 
problems of the tax state instead of solving them in the long term.  
If one considers the incentives for politicians to circumvent budget restrictions in serving 
the wishes of voters and interest groups one has to take into account that these budget 
regulations themselves have a decisive influence on the political costs of their circum-
vention (Mühlenkamp 2010: 31 ff.): The “temptation” to bypass budgetary and/or 
debt limits inherent to PPPs requires that the respective budgetary rules discriminate 
alternative forms of financing regarding the given transparency. Here particularly fiscal 
accounting (cameralistics), which is widely used in public accounting, offers excellent 
concealment opportunities (Mühlenlamp 2010; de Vries 2011): While public invest-
ment fully affects the budget as an expenditure in the first year and possibly breaks the 
budget limit, this same measure, organised through a PPP, can overcome the given 
budget limits: A PPP makes it possible to realise a project because the funding re-
quirement is evenly spread over the lifespan of the project and therefore stays below 
the budget constraint (Vining/Boardman 2008: 12 f.). 
If a comparative profitability analysis is performed – as sometimes required by budget 
regulations, but often neglected in practice – using the usual net present value method, 
an additional net present value for the PPP would result if based on a sufficiently high 
interest rate, so that the result of the comparative profitability analysis would reflect 
favourably on the PPP because in this case public expenditures are incurred later.  
 
Furthermore a statement of debt can be avoided through a PPP. If the project is of an 
investive nature, depending on the respective budget law, the credit ceiling would be 
raised accordingly, so that de facto full credit financing with a corresponding increase 
in the national debt. The ensuing payment obligations are, in contrast, not classified as 
debt and so arouse little attention. The situation is similar for public guarantees. PPPs 
are thus an ideal instrument, not just for circumventing short-term budget limits, but also 
for masking debt.  
If one wanted to diminish or even eliminate the existing political appeal of PPPs, even 
uneconomical ones, the corresponding budgetary provisions would have to be made. 
Accordingly Engel/Fischer/Galetovic (2009: 3) propose “to ensure that PPP assets are 
counted as public investments at the moment they are built.” This approach is bound to 
pose statistical demarcation problems on the one hand and, at least in the case of 
double-entry accounting, methodical difficulties on the other. In the case of cameralistic 
accouting this approach does not relieve of the need to define, regulate and enforce Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    8 
debt limits. De Vries (2011) proposes a “prospective taxation test”, whereby every-
thing within the scope of PPPs that leads to subsequent tax payments counts as public 
debt. Another proposed alternative (Mühlenkamp 2010: 35) is the obligatory exten-
sion of the planning period beyond one budget period. The financial effects of conven-
tional projects as well as PPPs over the entire lifespan or contractual period would 
have to be reported. According to the cameralistic perspective this would pertain to 
future expenditures. Under the double-entry regime future expenditures would have to 
be disclosed. Budget planers and decision-makers would then have to give thought to 
how they would balance income and expenditures or revenues and expenses in the 
long run. However, without effective debt limitation rules, cameralistic budget balanc-
ing can always be achieved by borrowing. In order to block this path debt limits have 
to be established.  
Regardless of the respective accounting system payment and expenditure obligations 
should, as far as possible, appear in a clearly visible position – e.g. under the total 
account or the balance/capital account – and not concealed in the attachments to the 
budget or the annual report. This increases transparency and lowers the incentive to 
make politically distorted financial decisions.  
Second, budget law would have to clearly regulate that in all decisions on public in-
vestments  and  PPPs  the  associated  long-term  financial  effects  and  existing  obliga-
tions/burdens would have to be considered and that, against this background, all non-
viable solutions are to be dismissed.  
Here it is important whether – as for example at state level – the enforcement of budg-
etary regulations can be achieved only through public attention and the ensuing politi-
cal pressure. Public influence is relatively small under the given budget regulations; 
constitutional restrictions on fiscal power have a stronger effect (Brennan/Buchanan 
2006). Alternatively, the enforcement of regulations – e.g. at municipal level – can be 
guaranteed, at least theoretically, through local authority supervision, i.e. on the basis 
of constitutional regulations. As long as local authorities really only approve borrowing 
and PPP when not in conflict with the long-term performance of the municipality, une-
conomical forms of task performance are not directly preventable. However, if the ap-
proval process requires that alternative and comparative economic analyses be submit-
ted, such a process has an overall disciplining effect. In the case of double-entry ac-
counting, consistent enforcement of the resulting balance must be ensured. This has the 
effect of an implicit debt brake and reduces the incentive to use PPPs to circumvent 
budgetary limits.  
In summary, the realisation remains that the political incentives to embrace even une-
conomical PPPs in order to extract political rents crucially depend on the respective 
budget regulations and can therefore also be mitigated through suitable institutional 
design  of  the  public  accounting  system  as  well  as  through  (constitutional)  control 
mechanisms (Ball et al. 2007; Brennan/Buchanan 2006). 
Efficiency as a rational argument for PPP solutions is not necessarily just a pretext ad-
vanced by politicians, as often assumed (Mühlenkamp 2006); rather the potentially Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    9 
greater efficiency of PPPs compared to conventional task fulfilment simultaneously may 
sustain political interests (coincidence of public and private interests):  
– Efficiency reduces, ceteris paribus, the need for expenditure making it easier to ob-
serve fiscal spending limits. 
– For the same reason, efficiency also tends to a certain acceleration of measures. 
– Because of the reduced need for refinancing in the case of user fees, efficiency also 
contributes to diffusing payment resistance (see section 5). 
 
2.3.3 Voters 
Voters are primarily interested in the benefit resulting from additional public services. 
Arrangements that allow further masking of the resulting costs (continuity of the fiscal 
illusion) are particularly welcome here: The modern tax state nurtures the fiscal illusion, 
i.e. the misconception that state services are afforded free of charge, by decoupling 
spending and income decisions and negotiating them in separate political arenas. This 
allows influential interest groups to encourage politicians to act as interest brokers and 
to  distribute  the  burden  of  public  tasks  among  less  articulate  or  assertive  groups 
(McCormick/Tollison 1981). As already illustrated, PPPs make it possible to perpetuate 
the fatal coordination and efficiency deficits of the tax state on the next step of the lad-
der and so meet with political approval. Only arrangements that lead to novel or addi-
tional refinancing through user fees destroy the fiscal illusion and evoke political re-
sistance (Gawel 2011; see section 5). 
 
2.3.4 Bureaucrats and the administration 
Ultimately political decision-making processes are also guided to a large extent by 
administrations:  Laws  are  prepared  by  ministerial  administrations  using  expert 
knowledge and are implemented and executed by administrative units. The “bureau-
crats” employed in these organisational units are not “pouvoir neutre” either, but self-
interested individuals concerned with influence and increased budget (Niskanen 1971; 
Tullock 1965). 
Administrations exert considerable influence on the realisation and success of PPPs – in 
designing framework conditions and contracts, in tendering procedures as well as in 
implementation. Since with PPPs, besides the actual production, further value-added 
steps are typically outsourced to the private sector, the interest of bureaucrats in PPP 
solutions is ambivalent: On the one hand if a budget is limited PPPs permit additional 
public measures which are associated with administrative influence and the manage-
ment of larger budgets. On the other hand PPPs demand a certain sharing of responsi-
bility with the private sector and hence a loss of power and influence on the side of 
public administration, which can no longer control all the value-added steps. Politicians 
and bureaucrats on the different levels of the political system (municipality, state, fed-
eral level) could also use such partnerships to “serve their clientel with public contracts” 
(Mühlenkamp 2006: 30). In the case of tasks that could essentially be fully privatised, Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    10 
in particular, the bureaucratic and political influence interests of administrations (but 
of politicians too) argue against releasing these functions from the public sector (Ben-
nett 2004: 589), but rather favour PPP solutions that guarantee a residual public influ-
ence. Thus, even indicated privatisation decisions can be similarly distorted (Villalonga 
2000; Savas 2000): That way, areas that would be accessible to full privatisation can 
be kept within the public sphere of influence.  
 
2.3.5 Private interests, public welfare and third party detrimental  
       contracts 
Political bias can result in too many or too few PPP measures. If inefficient PPPs are 
realised for political reasons it can on the one hand be at the expense of the actually 
indicated public task performance, but also at the expense of efficient privatisation not 
being realised.  
The perspective of actors guided by self-interest on which this is based has not gone 
unchallenged. Some scholars consider the hypothesis of the Self-Interest Axiom as a 
basis for political interaction to be overstated (Krumm/Mause 2009). Even if one does 
not care to sustain the fiction that public authorities are oriented toward the common 
good, some do doubt that the result must always be a negative political bias: Sadka 
(2007: 488), for instance, explains in a conciliatory tone: “It may well be the case that 
PPPs were initiated as a means of evading expenditure controls and hiding budget 
deficits […] When properly designed, in particular with respect to the sharing of risks 
between the public and private partners, PPPs can improve the quality of services pro-
vided before solely by the public sector, without raining their costs to society as a 
whole.” The crucial question here is with what probability are “properly designed” 
institutional arrangements expected? At best, individual and public interests coincide 
(harmony of interests) resulting in more cost-effective and/or qualitatively better ser-
vices. However, in the worst possible case of a conflict of interests, a political bias is 
likely to occur, at the same time making itself felt as a welfare loss.  
The suitability of PPPs for circumventing budgetary barriers and the associated earning 
or profit opportunities for private enterprises can easily explain why politicians and 
participating enterprises (especially the construction industry, banks and consultants) 
might have a joint interest in implementing PPPs, even when from the viewpoint of re-
gional authorities or taxpayers other solutions make more sense. Why do taxpayers 
put up with this? First, the efficiency characteristic is not obvious, but rather as a result 
of information asymmetry this information is hidden from the public. Therefore targeted 
investment can be made in political disinformation in order to make citizens believe 
that PPP is the best alternative. In addition taxpayers who subscribe to the fiscal illusion 
do not feel directly burdened by (government) spending projects. This is why they will 
insist  more  strongly  on  the  implementation,  i.e.  incurring  expenditures,  than  on  the 
economic viability of the financing on the revenue side. Lastly, political control is a 
public good (Mühlenkamp 2006: 42): The continuous control of politicians by voters 
(and  the  control  of  bureaucrats  by  politicians)  is  an  agency  problem  (Dewatrip-
ont/Legros 2005), whereby a large part of the resulting benefit is reaped by others, Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    11 
even though the controller must pay the costs of the control out of his own pocket. That 
is why relatively little control is to be expected, with agents (politicians, bureaucrats) 
having discretionary scope for action instead.  
 
3. Political involvement and design of PPPs: Insights from transaction 
cost theory and theory of incomplete contracts 
3.1 Transaction costs, relationship-specific capital and efficient contracts 
According to transaction cost theory (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975; 1985) a com-
parison of the production costs and perhaps the benefit of public services in the case 
of public production with those of private production is not sufficient. Next to the pro-
duction costs it is equally important to also consider the transaction costs ensuing from 
the initiation, conclusion and monitoring of the contract and the contract implementa-
tion. So from the transaction cost theory perspective the inclusion of private partners is 
only appropriate when the sum of the production and transaction costs is lower than 
that incurred by purely public task fulfilment (Greiling 2002: 342; Välilä 2005; Müh-
lenkamp 2006; Budäus/Grüb 2007). 
The amount of the transaction costs largely depends on the specificity of the capital to 
be deployed for a particular transaction (for empirical studies see Obermann 2007; 
Välilä 2005). Specific capital can only be deployed with the current contract partner 
with full returns. Because specific capital often has to be used in PPP contracts, de-
pendencies between the contractual parties and higher transaction costs, particularly 
for collateral, are the result. Dependencies increase the probability of renegotiations 
with the aim of removing the other party’s expected advantage (so-called quasi-rents) 
from  the  contract  (holdup  problem  –  Hart/Moore  1988;  Nöldecke/Schmidt  1995; 
Bolton/Dewatripont 2005). 
Basically, transaction cost theory says that as the volume of specific capital increases 
more integrated solutions or the institutional arrangement “hierarchy” (instead of “con-
tract”) should be chosen. PPPs are therefore problematic when it comes to specific in-
vestments or when there is a high dependency on contract compliance and/or realisa-
tion of the originally planned transaction relationship. Hence it is easier to outsource 
cleaning services to the private sector than for instance wastewater treatment plants or 
the military (Mühlenkamp 2006: 45). 
Now in the relevant literature, which goes on the premise of profit-oriented private con-
tract partners, it has emerged that specific investments can basically be collateralised 
by certain types of contracts so that a hierarchy is not necessarily needed in order to 
guarantee  specific  investments  and  defend  against  holdups  (Bös  2001; 
Bös/Lülfesmann 1996). Translated to public tasks this result seems at a glance to imply 
that the activation of private enterprises to fulfil public tasks represents a correspond-
ingly  solvable  contractual  problem.  However  as  long  as  the  public  authorities  are 
committed to maximising welfare rather than making profits, they have less room to 
negotiate/act than private enterprises with the result that under certain circumstances – 
unlike between profit-maximizing contract partners – they are not in a position to con-
clude an efficient contract (Bös/Lülfesmann 2001).  Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    12 
One particular reason for this is the incentive asymmetry that exists between public and 
private contract partners in terms of their use of options to collateralize specific invest-
ments  and  in  renegotiations:  While  private  enterprises  are  motivated  by  individual 
profit interests, public negotiators – when not oriented towards the common good – 
stay in the range of low-cost decisions (Kirchgässner 1992) that do not affect them per-
sonally. As a result, it can be expected that contracts between the public authorities 
and private enterprises tend not to turn out in favour of the public authorities (Bös 
2001; Bös/Lülfesmann 2001). 
 
3.2 PPPs, incomplete contracts and renegotiations 
From an institutional economics perspective PPP arrangements must be concluded in 
the form of highly incomplete contracts. The incompleteness of the PPP contracts creates 
significant room for manoeuvre and increases – as does dependency from the use of 
specific  capital  (3.1)  –  the  probability  for  renegotiations.  Here  once  again  profit-
oriented private actors are structurally at an advantage. Against this background En-
gel/Fischer/Galetovic (2009) formulate a theoretical model from which it can be de-
rived that the behaviour of enterprises when bidding is such that they anticipate the 
possibility of renegotiation and therefore tend to respond to calls for tender with low 
bids in order to win the competition or to make a PPP appear favourable. Since the 
political level is also interested in implementing PPPs and thus a large proportion of the 
costs can be passed on to subsequent generations of politicians, renegotiations take 
place  soon  after  the  contract  has  been  awarded,  allowing  the  bidders  to  distance 
themselves from their (too) low bids.  
This can lead to lock-in effects: This means that the task or service to be performed 
within the framework of the PPP is so specific that once the PPP contract has been con-
cluded both partners have practically no way of getting out of it again. The adjustment 
and design measures are then largely shaped by the existing power structures between 
the partners and possible information asymmetries. In this context the different cultures 
between private and public partners are also potentially significant. 
In fact, for Latin America it can be shown that approx. 30 % of just under 1000 con-
cession contracts that were concluded between 1985 and 2000 ended up being re-
negotiated (Engel/Fischer/Galetovic 2009). In the area of transport infrastructure the 
rate of renegotiation was approx. 54 %. In the water sector the rate was as high as 74 
%. In most renegotiations the concession holders came off better than before. Frequent-
ly concessionaires manage to push through tariff increases and reductions in their in-
vestment obligations. Interestingly, a large proportion of the renegotiation already took 
place during the construction phase. For Chile an evaluation of 50 concession con-
tracts in the period between 1993 and 2006 (ibid) reveals that just under three rene-
gotiations per contract took place resulting in an average increase in spending of 30 
%. Most of this was due to the need for additional work (supplements) and was al-
ready  agreed  during  the  construction  period.  Interestingly,  within  the  framework  of 
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holders, two thirds of the additional expenditures were shifted into subsequent legisla-
tion periods.  
The empirical findings support the theoretical model, since the incompleteness of long-
term contracts suggests that contractual adjustments would not be expected at such 
early stages as is observed. Therefore early-stage contractual adjustments indicate a 
strategic  behaviour  of  the  participants.  It  would  seem  that  there  is  implied  con-
sent/agreement between political level and bidding enterprises on the quick modifica-
tion of signed contracts (Mühlenkamp 2010: 34 f.).  
Lastly, it should be noted that procurement procedures within the context of conven-
tional task fulfilment also offer incentives to make low bids with subsequent renegotia-
tions in order to win contracts and to facilitate the political enforceability of projects. 
However, one decisive difference between conventional procurement and PPP lies in 
the fact that within the scope of PPP contracts it is not only the value-added step “build-
ing” that is up for negotiation, but rather several value-added steps. As a result, PPPs 
establish far more starting points for renegotiation than conventionally realised pro-
jects. This increases the taxpayer’s spending and/or cost risk. 
 
4. The socio-political dimension: Governance, legitimacy and control 
4.1 Challenges and risks 
Of course, apart from the “economics of PPP” (see De Bettignies/Ross 2004 and Grim-
sey/Lewis 2005 for surveys), political involvement also plays a role in the socio-political 
dimension. This relates on the one hand to changes in the political decision-making 
structures and options resulting from the extensive use of PPPs. On the other hand it is 
connected to the legitimation of the input of public resources within the scope of PPPs. 
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that public services in a PPP can be controlled and 
steered in the same way as in an organisational unit which is entirely in public owner-
ship. Hence there is a need for differentiated legitimation and control options for the 
various different types of PPP.  
From a socio-political perspective the question that arises in relation to PPP is of a 
democratic-theoretical nature: Why and how is the application of this new political 
instrument democratically legitimated? Schäferhoff et al. (2007: 24 ff.) discuss legitima-
tion according to the criteria of inclusivity, responsibility and deliberation. They refer to 
the issues of state sovereignty, the legitimation and political control. Since within the 
scope of PPP-solutions private interest groups participate in decision-making on public 
tasks, i.e. spending of public budgets, significant distribution effects are feared: A “de-
privilisation” of interests that are weakly articulated or asserted (Sack 2009) could go 
against important public task fulfilment goals. In addition, the active participation of 
private contractors with their own profit interests might increase the probability of a 
trend towards deregulation because regulation results in reduced profits: less quality, 
less security and less environmental protection are the feared outcome. Finally, “forced 
PPPs” on the initiative of private contractors could come into play, whereby projects that 
can not be implemented democratically might potentially be realised. A certain tenden-
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Furthermore it has to be taken into account that stronger participation of the private sec-
tor in the fulfilment of public tasks is not merely associated with a change or erosion of 
the classical model of statehood, it also raises questions of sovereignty and control 
(Grande/Pauly 2005): The transfer of tasks that are exclusively in public ownership to 
any form of PPP whatsoever reduces the scope of direct democratic control (Rügemer 
2004). In this context the argument is also put forward of asymmetric distribution of 
information between the partners of different origin or partners with divergent under-
standings  and  expectations  which  in  the  event  of  a  breakdown  in  competition  and 
breakdown  of  public  control  would  lead  to  precisely  the  opposite  of  the  objectives 
sought, namely to rent-seeking behaviour and inefficient arrangements at the expense 
of the taxpayer (cf. Greiling 2002: 341-342). Börzel/Risse (2005: 207) classify PPPs 
into  a  context  of  the successive erosion of  the  foundations  of  “Westphalian  state-
hood”:  “Moreover,  whether  such  delegation  and  contracting  out  is  consistent  with 
Westphalian sovereignty crucially depends on the ability of states ,to take it back, in 
the sense of having the capability to compensate for failures of self-regulated private 
actors by direct intervention. This capability might be a given in a strict legal sense 
(as the very term delegation implies), but how realistic is this politically? What does it 
mean for Westphalian sovereignty when a legal right increasingly becomes an empty 
possibility?” However the authors warn against overrating the aspect of potential loss-
es of sovereignty and control and argue instead that it should rather be regarded as 
the price for increased problem-solving capacity and legitimation of international poli-
cy (Börzel/Risse 2005: 208). As Pauly/Grande (2005: 11) stress, one should assume 
less a loss of sovereignty than the complex conditions of mutual recognition of sover-
eign actors, the division, transformation and the different development of internal and 
external sovereignty.  
 
4.2 The problem of control 
Hence how these mostly long-term PPP projects can best be subjected to democratic 
control by the administration, and ultimately by parliament and citizens too, is a central 
question in political science. From an economic perspective this concern is reflected in 
efforts to tie the allocation of goods in the public sector as closely as possible to the 
preferences of the citizens. Of course, market preference control and democratic control 
don’t only have deviating modal forms, costs and opportunities, they also target differ-
ent aspects. To that extent (increasing) market control is certainly no substitute for (de-
creasing) political control. Still it must be noted that the repeatedly bemoaned erosion of 
democratic control is simultaneously accompanied by a systematic “trade off between 
legitimation and effectiveness” (Krumm/Mause 2009: 114). The loss of transparency 
and political responsibility in PPPs could at the same time imply a gain in effectiveness 
and efficiency in the fulfillment of tasks and therefore develop elements of market con-
trol.  
Which control regime appears more efficient is also a question of institutional competi-
tion. At least from an economic perspective there are significant doubts as to whether 
a “democratic control” which is exercised by means of the current political process 
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public sector to citizens’ preferences (Brennan/Buchanan 2006). The current crisis of 
the tax state clearly points to a spectacular failure of democratic control: The secular 
expansion of spending in order to serve particularist interests along with the concurrent 
de-coupling of revenue procurement, increasingly through public debt has – despite or 
precisely because of democratic control – just led to a financial, debt and acceptance 
crisis of the tax state, as can now be observed (Gawel 2012). If public tasks are fi-
nanced through the national budget, citizens get the impression that they can use a 
motorway, tunnel or other infrastructure “free of charge” while the “state” courteously 
pays the bill (fiscal illusion). Ironically, it is precisely this development that has pushed 
the tax state, so easily given to refinancing, to the fiscal limits: It is no longer able to 
finance the tasks it is expected to perform! If the design of institutions and incentives is 
problematic the watchdog of democratic control will lead directly to the reverse. 
Against this background, democratic control could be strengthened either in another 
way conceptually e.g. through participation or through direct democracy – or alterna-
tively one accepts partial erosion as the result of the described trade-off in favour of 
more efficient market controls. One way of counteracting information and control prob-
lems which is discussed in the literature is greater participation of citizens in the plan-
ning of PPP projects (Krumm/Mause 2009), as is the case in Switzerland’s system of 
direct democracy. An empirical study focussed on the aspect of citizen participation by 
Mittendorf (2008: 320) shows that direct democracy processes rarely prevent (partial) 
privatisations but they can bring about public debate and sometimes slow down the 
process. The main function of direct democratic processes might well be to establish 
transparency and to bring about a discussion of the consequences and rationale of 
privatisation measures. The experiences of the Swiss with referendum democracy clear-
ly indicate that the anticipation of possible reasons for rejection (“referendum security”) 
results in the political process becoming much more inclusive and transparent, which in 
turn can have a positive effect on the side of input legitimation (of PPPs).  
 
5. Political involvement as a barrier to PPP projects:  
    the case of user-fee financing 
It is by no means always true that political involvement leads to PPP being politically 
preferred beyond its economic preferability. The fact that political considerations can 
also  bring  about  a  disadvantage  for  PPP  is  demonstrated  by  the  example  of  the 
concession model, in which the project costs are covered by user fees. This is where, 
next to private financing in the strict sense, private funding also appears (de Vries 
2011). This changes the decicion makers’ political cost calculation – especially under 
the conditions of the modern tax state (Gawel 2011).  
If the private operator of an infrastructure project is allowed to charge user fees for 
refinancing,  then  the  public  budget  –  unlike  other  forms  of  PPP  –  is  permanently 
relieved (de Vries 2011: “genuine off-public-balance route”), but the users (and at the 
same time the voters) are held directly responsible for the cost; their fiscal illusion is 
shattered.  User-fee  financing  that  could  additionally  satisfy  spending  wishes  while 
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political  decision-makers;  however,  politically  speaking,  the  consequences  must  be 
weighed up on acceptance markets – on the one hand the expected sanctions that 
result from “fee weariness” and on the other hand the reward promised by additional 
spending programmes.  
 
5.1 The political economy of user-fee financing:  
      From tax resistance to “fee resistance”  
The weaknesses of the tax state are usually explained using political economy models 
(Leviathan theory, median voter theory, interest group and bureaucracy theory) as, due 
to the self-interests of the particpating actors and the institutional particularities of the 
co-ordination  process  through  voting  markets,  the  political  process  of  democratic 
decision-making  is  hardly  in  a  position  to  secure  the  necessary  coupling  of  public 
services to citizens’ preferences (Hansjürgens 1998). The result would be efficiency 
losses in state action. 
Apart from this, political economy can also contribute to estimating the chances of the 
political realisation of PPP innovations that rely on user-fee financing and therefore 
contribute to transforming the state revenue system. This is where political appreciation 
of  PPPs  touches  on  problems  of  the  benefit  principle  for  public  revenues.  Public 
spending and the revenues required for it are coupled by means of user-fee financing; 
this  shatters  the  comfortable  fiscal  illusion  in  tax-funded  budgets  and  changes  the 
political  support  for  the  respective  projects  –  again  regardless  of  the  economic 
advantages.  
Looking at the political realisation of user-financed PPP solutions, the question arises of 
whether political entrepreneurs are interested in a loss of their discretionary room for 
manoeuvre and the possibilities of separate serving of spending wishes and resistance 
to  burden  sharing  as  “transfer  brokers”.  How  does  the  “increase  in  visibility  and 
therefore  the  tangibility  of  taxes”  (Hansjürgens  1998:  312)  affect  the  political 
gratification  of  spending  programmes  on  consent  markets?  Are  those  who  are 
obligated  to  pay,  who  are  simultaneously  voters,  interested  in  breaking  the  fiscal 
illusion, and how do interest groups react to the imminent shortening of their windows 
of  opportunity  for  rent  seeking,  which  is  always  made  easier  when  decisions  on 
expenditures and revenues are made in separate political arenas? 
Traditionally, the literature has paid a lot of attention to “tax resistance”, which results 
from the lack of returns from the tax and demotivates the taxpayer from paying yet 
another individual tax sacrifice for an exclusion-free supply of public services (Braak 
1983). However “tax resistance” is also to be expected at the consititutional level, i.e. 
in  the  question  of  which  financing  norms  should  be  established  to  enable  public 
services,  mainly  when  these  decisions  are  made  not  from  behind  Rawls’s  veil  of 
ignorance but out of anticipated concern for interests. This is especially true when a 
transformation  from  a  given  (ability-to-pay  oriented)  tax-state  arrangement  to  a 
payment model has to be found. This “payment resistance” is not fed by the lack of 
returns  as  in  the  tax  case  rather  it  is  fuelled  by  resentment  at  now  having  to  pay 
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possible free utilisation up to the point of satiation and implies the certain withdrawal 
of purchasing power, which is unlikely to be compensated by a lowering of the tax 
burden  in  another  area.  In  terms  of  political  interests  the  potentially  possible 
improvement of allocative efficiency of the supply of state goods through PPP as a 
public  good  fails  to  draw  a  response;  there  is  no  political  gratification.  PPP  is 
measured purely by the yardstick of individual costs and benefits.  
There  is  solid  empirical  evidence  for  the  existence  of  payment  resistance  (Gawel 
2011).  Constitutional  payment  resistance  thus  turns  out  to  be  a  powerful  brake  in 
system transformation also for user-financed PPPs: Politicians do not want to surrender 
their  discretionary  windows  of  opportunity  and  fear  the  mobilsation  of  resistances 
among who have payment obligations; Citizens value the cost illusion, interest groups 
their rent-seeking options, and the efficiency of state activity remains a public good 
without support in the political process. Let us now take a closer look these concepts, 
taking user-fee financing of transport infrastructure as an example.  
 
5.2 Opportunities and problems associated with user-financed  
      highway infrastructure 
The use of transport infrastructure is particularly suited to user-fee financing (Kühling et 
al. 2011; Kossak/Pällmann 2009): As a mixed-public “toll good”, highways at any 
rate have an exclusion technique that can be organised at acceptable cost. In practice, 
user-fee financing of transport routes is practiced in many different forms at home and 
abroad (Gawel/Schmidt 2010: 61 ff.), also as PPPs (Gawel 2011). These PPPs belong 
to the long-term infrastructure contracts (LTIC-type PPP – Hodge/Greve 2009). 
From  an  economic  perspective,  the  applicaiton  of  user-financed  operator  models  is 
primarily  associated  with  the  benefit  principle  advantages  of  revenue  procurement 
(Alfen 2001; Gawel/Schmidt 2010): Here the costs are passed on directly to the users 
of  cars  and  trucks  according  to  the  causation  principle,  and  not  to  the  broader 
population  of  taxpayers  according  to  the  burden  distribution  regulations  of  the  tax 
system. It seems “fair” when individual users of transport infrastructure are only obliged 
to pay to the extent that they receive “returns” (“just exchange”). In addition, benefit 
financing is seen as advantageous because as a result of the coupling of service and 
costs budget decisions are more rational and at the same time directed towards the 
preferences of the consumers; the demand must distance itself from the fiscal illusion in 
the provision of public goods, i.e. the idea that infrastructure goods provided by the 
state at no charge are “free”. In this way the true costs of the provision of infrastructure 
are made transparent (diminishing the cost illusion), resulting in solutions which are 
more in line with the market while also counteracting excess demand.  
In  contrast  an  ability-to-pay-oriented  tax  financing  system  does  not  directly  link 
revenues with expenditures, but relies solely on the economic capactiy of the taxpayers 
when calculating the financing contributions, regardless of use. Efficiency aspects of a 
public provision of goods can not be fulfilled in this way. The political supply is de-
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turn articulate an inefficient infrastructure requirement corresponding to the point of 
satiation. 
However the sole application of preference-oriented infrastructure control/management 
naturally  reaches  limits;  to  that  extent  the  known  disadvantages  of  equivalence 
financing  give  cause  for  restrictions  and  modifications:  Besides  the  social 
consequences  of  exclusion  through  payment  for  the  use  of  infrastructure,  positive 
external effects of the infrastructure that can not be reflected in market demand also 
have to be considered. In other cases there might also be cause for a merit-based 
correction of preference, because the user revenues would otherwise flow primarily 
into the expansion of existing routes that are in high demand.  
The negative employment and growth effects in the transport sector that stem from the 
payment obligation for the use of infrastructure may be socially efficient because the 
full costs of transport services have to be factored into the price, thus leading to an 
efficient supply. However, at the same time these effects are awkward at the political 
level, since the interests of freight carriers are so easily organised politically and they 
can refer to follow-on effects for the common good (jobs, growth). This leads on to the 
question of exactly what prospects does the economically meaningful implementation 
of user-fee financing have in the political process (5.3).  
 
5.3 On the political economy of user-financed transport infrastructure 
Even  socially  profitable  PPP-based  infrastructure  projects  require  political 
implementation and depend on the acceptance of the potental users. Hence political-
economical obstacles have to be taken into consideration (Gawel 2011). To do so we 
will first examine the interests of the users (section 5.3.1), and then those of political 
entrepreneurs  (5.3.2)  and  lastly  those  of  “bureaucrats”  (5.3.3).  What  then  are  the 
concrete chances of overcoming “constitutional fee resistance” (see also section 5.2 
above)? 
 
5.3.1  User-fee  financing  and  behavioural  pricing:  Willingness-to-pay 
and political acceptance  
User-fee financing sucessfully contributes to the fulfillment of public tasks, if and as far 
as there is sufficient willingness-to-pay for PPP programmes on the part of the users. If 
forced  demand  -  for  example  in  the  form  of  the  “obligation  to  connect  and  use” 
common  for  municipal  services  –  is  waived,  then  willingness-to-pay  determines  the 
refinancing possiblities of a project. According to allocation theory precisely this would 
be welcome, since in the meaning of equivalence, the preference of the users weighed 
up against the project costs lies above the realisation of infrastructure measures. From 
the viewpoint of the (public or private) project operator the so-called traffic volume risk 
is realised here. If the operator carries this risk, a market-based equivalence of the 
infrastructure financing would be established. The users decide on the realisation of 
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In  fact,  the  so-called  F-model  in  Germany  (see  Gawel  2011)  foresees  the  initial 
provision of state funding to launch the project, so that from the outset users only pay a 
part of the project costs. In view of the economic and regional-political spillover effects 
of area coverage along with prediction uncertainties and other political risks, this may 
still  count  as  proper  sharing  of  the  financing  responsibility.  Futhermore  the  law  on 
public fees guarantees that the operator’s costs will be covered, so that in fact the 
traffic volume risk is carried by the users, who may theoretically have to compensate 
for  the  lack  of  demand  with  arbitrary  increases  in  the  toll  charges.  Because  this 
typically triggers a downward fee spiral, in the case of realised F-projects that were 
plagued by a lack of demand from the outset, the public authorities helped out by 
granting concessions, for example by extending the concession period (Gawel 2011).  
The allocative control effect is watered down even more when – as has happened on 
several  occasions  –  in  cases  of  insufficiently  projected  traffic  volumes  or  high 
anticipated  risks  for  the  private  operators,  politically  desired  projects  are  suddenly 
realised after all from the general budget (Gawel 2011). In this way, the market-based 
information on the clearly inadequate cost-benefit relationship is ignored by the public 
planner.  Here  the  political  realisation  of  these  projects  takes  place  entirely 
independently of the users’ willingness to pay.  
But in this arrangement too, the private willingness to pay remains a key factor for the 
success of a user-financed project. For this determines the risk for the private investor 
and  the  potential  transaction  costs  for  renegotiations.  Moreover,  experiences  in 
Germany show that willingness to pay is “low” in the sense that the demand at least 
fell significantly short of the respective estimated traffic volumes and, considering the 
project costs, was anything but adequate (Gawel 2011). Given high value attached to 
an efficient transport infrastructure how can the restraint of the users be explained? 
Finally, international experiences demonstrate that a cost-covering user financing of 
road  transport  infrastructure  based  on  PPP  is  entirely  feasible 
(Shaoul/Stafford/Stapelton 2006). 
First it seems clear that infrastructure users who are accustomed to the fiscal illusion 
will,  out  of  their  own  political  intersests,  reject  a  sudden  payment  obligation, 
particularly  if  this  is  experienced  as  an  additional  burden  with  no  change  to  the 
remaining  tax  burden.  In  contrast  to  neighbouring  European  countries,  where  the 
motorway network was largley financed through charges, the challenge in Gemany is 
to convert the existing system, which the user to date has perceived as “free”, to a fee-
financing system in order to maintain and expand the network. At the same time – as a 
second complication specific to Germany – the F-models, as singular projects, remain 
alien in a system of otherwise predominantly charge-free use of road infrastructure. 
Both factors put a strain on the acceptance of user financing. The willingness to pay for 
a  service  that  hitherto  appeared  to  be  available  free  of  charge  and  where  the 
obligation  to  pay  only  appears  as  an  exception  in  certain  places  is  obviously 
extremely low (Alfen 2001: 6). Resistance in political arenas and on voting markets 
(“political resistance”) but also “economic resistance” as a result of demand refusal 
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The  provision  of  tolled  road  infrastructure  represents  a  competitive  economy  output 
without forced demand, which for a variety of reasons can meet with low willingness 
to pay or flagging quantities demanded:  
– there is no obligation to use; 
– direct alternative routes provide close substitutes; 
– a dense general transport network provides broad substitutes for avoiding individual 
tolled objects; 
– the demand for the tolled good does not represent an essential demand and is cor-
respondingly price-sensitive; 
– the consumers decide under “fiscal illusion”: the toll-free use of the route segment 
and the exceptional nature of the toll object in the tax-financed route system set “ref-
erence prices” close to zero and damage the perceived price fairness and therefore 
the acceptance of the toll.  
Acceptance  deficits,  which  are  manifested  in  low  willingness  to  pay,  can  also  be 
explained by means of the Theory of Behavioural Pricing (Maxwell/Estelami 2009) 
and so at the same time can be re-shaped in terms of price theory (endogenisation of 
the  acceptance  aspect):  The  starting  point  of  Behavioural  Pricing  is  a  behavioural-
scientific  and  in  particular  a  psychological  foundation  of  price-based  demand 
behaviour.  While  in  neoclassical  models  of  price  theory  an  individual  only  has  to 
compare the supplier’s price with his own maximum willingness to pay (reservation 
price) in order to come to a demand decision, in Behavioural Pricing models, among 
others,  
– subjective price perception and  
– subjective price evaluation play an important role, in particular the “price fairness” 
experienced, which comes into question when, for instance, the consumers have the 
impression that they are in a predicament and the supplier is taking advantage.  
An  important  class  of  model  of  Behavioural  Pricing  is  represented  by  so-called 
reference price models (Lichtenstein et al. 1990). This is followed by the individual 
price assessment by means of a judgement anchor as a reference value, to which the 
given supplier price must be related. Here various price categories can be taken as a 
measure of comparison:  
– current comparative values, 
– historical comparative values, 
– intrinsic  reference  prices  such  as  the  reservation  price,  the  expected  price  for  a 
good of comparable type and quality, a price usually seen as the “standard price” 
etc.  
When pricing previously tariff-free use of transport infrastructure (as in Germany) the 
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– current comparative values (e.g. tariff-free parallel routes, but also all other roads in 
the national transport network) indicate the value zero; 
– historical comparative values (tariff-free use of highways) also deliver “zero infor-
mation”; 
– as a result of the nurturing of the fiscal illusion all intrinsic reference prices (expecta-
tion, perceived standard price and reservation price as the maximum willingness to 
pay for a toll) should be adjusted to zero.  
At the same time, for exceptional objects, meaning all measures projected according 
to the F-model in an otherwise free transport network, price fairness can be critical: 
Anyone  who  only  grants  a  certain  passage,  e.g.  the  transfer  to  an  island  holiday 
home,  at  a  charge  exposes  himself  to  suspicion  of  taking  advantage  of  the  users’ 
predicament  (no  alternative  routes).  From  a  theoretical  perspective,  projects  of  this 
nature are likely to meet with very low acceptance. 
A reference price model with a framing effect suitable for our purposes goes back to 
Thaler (1985): Framing in this case is to be unterstood as the institutional setting for an 
assessment  decision.  A  framing  effect  arises  when  the  setting  itself  influences  the 
decision  (relevance  of  the  assessment  frame).  In  reference  price  models  negative 
deviations of a selling price which is under assessment from the reference price are 
experienced  as  profit  (“gain”),  whereas  positive  deviations  are  experienced  as 
sacrifice (“loss”). Experimental economcis research has now discovered that people 
don’t by any means place equal value on “gains” and “losses”, but rather evaluate 
these  differently.  The  so-called  Prospect  Theory  goes  back  to  Kahneman/Tversky 
(1979), who contend that the assessment of the utility of “gains” is concave, whereas 
that  of  “losses”  is  convex.  The  result  being  that  –  in  absolute  terms  -  an  upwards 
deviation  from  the  reference  point  endows  less  utility  than  an  identically  equal 
downwards deviation results in feelings of sacrifice (losses loom larger effect). 
Against this backdrop Thaler (1985) introduced the differentiation between acquisition 
utility and transaction utility in consumer behaviour: 
– The acquisition value for a consumer describes the difference between the reserva-
tion price pRes, i.e. the maximum willingness-to-pay for a good of this type and quali-
ty, and the selling price p; 
– The transaction value on the other hand denotes the difference between the selling 
price p and a reference price pR, e.g. a “fair price”. 
An individual who is neo-classically oriented will make his decision based exclusively 
on acquisition utility and will not allow himself to be impressed or disappointed by 
“gains” or “losses” in comparison to the reference price. However, in the Behavioural 
Pricing model an emotionally competent individual will also allow disappointment or 
pleasure to enter into his purchasing decision according to the transaction utility.  
The differentiation introduced by Thaler (1985) can now explain why nonetheless a 
consumer refuses the purchase of a good with the highest acquisition utility (i.e. the Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    22 
highest consumer surplus), because the selling price – measured against the reference 
price - “disappoints” him. 
In the toll case this could explain why civil engineering constructions, which due to 
their “surprise” payment obligation appear as foreign bodies in the road network, are 
evaluated and demanded below their acquisition utility. To that extent, all traffic fore-
casts that fail to consider the “loss effect” of disappointed transaction utility are bound 
to go astray.  
If we pick up the idea of the Prospect Theory according to Kahnemann/Tversky (1979) 
and evalute gains und losses differently, then the following evaluation function would 
result:  
  = !1 ( pRes – p) + !2 (pR – p),      !1 , !2 > 0 
Applying this to the toll model (Gawel/Schmidt 2010: 119 ff.) would then proceed 
from the assumption that the previously charge-free provision of transport infrastructure 
and the remaining exceptional character of individual segments of the road network 
now being subject to charges would feed the fiscal illusion and set problematic refer-
ence prices for toll goods (pR = 0). 
  = !1 ( pRes – p) - !2 (p),      !1 , !2 > 0 
In a model of this type every positive price for the toll good means a disappointment 
which threatens to erode the acquisition utility. According to the model the only possi-
ble solution is to raise the reference price. How could such an adjustment of the refer-
ence price be successful? 
– The utility of the toll good, but above all of user financing, could be intensively 
communicated in such a way that private sector solutions appear less unfair; 
– Alternative routes could be closed so that comparative reference prices do not turn 
out to the disadvantage of the toll object; however this could just as easily have an 
adverse effect on fairness opinion (creation of a predicament); 
– Improving the service supplied by the toll good: If the new offer provides noticeably 
better service, e.g. more comfort, multi-lane traffic routing, time-saving passage, the 
fairness judgement of toll goods can be improved;  
– “Updating” reference prices: Finally, attempts can be made to raise reference pric-
es over time through simple habituation effects (“updates”) (Briesch et al. 1997; 
Kopalle/Lindsey-Mullikin  2003).  Initially,  moderate  introductory  prices  are 
charged, which push the reference prices up over time and later allow higher sell-
ing prices.  
 
5.3.2 PPP user financing and political entrepreneurs  
Just how promising is user financing from the point of view of the interests of “political 
entrepreneurs”? After all, it is not only political decisions that are required to open up 
legal options for user-based financing of infrastructure measures, each of these individ-Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    23 
ual projects has to find political support and, in particular, must be pushed through 
against “fee resistance”.  
However, the incentives for the political realisation of social efficient transport infra-
structure through toll financing, for example through premiums on voting markets, seem 
generally weak: On the one hand the charging of tolls in itself is already unpopular 
because fee-based financing makes the costs of transport infrastructure visible and spe-
cifically allocates these costs to the user. Compared with the system of burden distribu-
tion, which is aligned along the less obvious incidence of the tax system, the users end 
up in a losing position in terms of redistribution policy. On the other hand it cannot be 
ruled out that a consistent implementation of user-based financing of infrastructure is 
associated with job losses in the transport sector, which evokes additional resistance 
from well-organised interest groups. Acceptance is also burdened by the prevailing 
fiscal illusion in the area of transport infrastructure as well as the exceptional position 
of individual toll projects which set problematic reference prices – as explained above. 
Acceptance on voting and other political consent markets is therefore critical (Ullrich 
2002). Although the perception of a cumulative burden as a result of toll charges and 
mobility taxes is not likely to affect utilisation decisions, it is certain to have a signifi-
cant influence on political approval ratings. This is why, particularly in the area of 
transport, the chances of gaining political approval for consistent equivalence financ-
ing are likely to be very small.  
Furthermore, given the regional incidence of selective user financing, resistance from 
local and regional authorities is to be expected, so the government does not operate 
“free of opponents” but must expect internal resistance: Federal, provincial and local 
authorities can easily come into conflict as a result of divergent interests (Gawel 2005: 
181 f.) 
Here  greater  appeal  is  undoubtedly  provided  by  traditional  tax-based  financing, 
where the fiscal illusion can be used to offer benefits in transport policy without (ap-
pearing  to  impose)  imposing  any  concrete  demands.  Consequently,  policy-makers 
rightly gauge user financing of public transport infrastructure as a highly delicate mat-
ter. For many years now the general passenger car toll has repeatedly appeared on 
the political agenda of individual ventures in Germany, but has to date failed accord-
ing to the exact same resistance pattern. Political competitors, in particular, never miss 
the opportunity to use the fiscal illusion and the perception of burden to their best inter-
ests on consent markets.  
For years transport policy in Germany appears to be stuck between the Scylla of a 
growing lack of tax funding and the Charybdis of fierce resistance to fee-based financ-
ing. The transition to user financed PPPs, although clearly indicated by a fiscal and 
allocation theory, is being thwarted for political and economic reasons.  
 
5.3.3 PPP user financing and “bureaucrats” 
In terms of political interests ministerial and planning bureaucrats are likely to be pri-
marily interested, wherever possible, in enlarging their budget and competency without 
objection  when  deciding  and  implementing  infrastructure  measures.  Restrictions Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    24 
through user financing, or even preference-guided infrastructure plans are hardly likely 
to find favour here. A similar lack of interest is demonstrated by the loss of importance 
attached to private operator models, where infrastructure projects are planned, con-
structed and operated by private investors. In contrast, tax-based financing and the de-
coupling of the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget process that typically goes 
with it offer ideal conditions for funding arrangements that are “unbiased” and free of 
objection from “financiers” (Birk/Eckhoff 2000: 65), and are particularly suited to ac-
commodating the interests of the planners. 
Of course, the/this picture is clouded by the ever more painfully clear limits of the tax 
state to supply sufficient funds, even for the maintenance of existing transport infrastruc-
ture. However in terms of the fiscal aspect of merely extending the financial room for 
manoeuvre for the further expansion of the route network, even “bureaucrats” are likely 
to demonstrate interest in complementary user financing. Naturally, this is more a mat-
ter of providing additional funds for classical fiscal expansion than about changing the 
system (Gawel 2011). 
 
6. Final remarks 
Decisions about PPPs (realisation, arrangement) are taken in the political arena and are 
therefore not theoretical optimisation exercises. The interests and resources of the actors 
who participate in the political decision-making process as well as the rules of the polit-
ical process have a powerful influence on whether, in what areas, and in what form 
PPPs are realised. The distance between this output and solutions that are theoretically 
desirable given certain ideal goals (e.g. efficiency) and conditions can be referred to as 
political bias. Political bias can on the one hand result in too few PPP measures – de-
pending on whether the political benefit and costs deviate from the social costs and 
benefits: Above all PPPs with user financing are likely to be held up; tax-financed PPPs 
on the other hand offer high political net advantages by circumventing traditional ac-
counting budget and debt limits. The respectively selected budget rules (e.g. cameral-
istic or double-entry) and the form of enforcement control (purely political or constitu-
tional control of compliance) affect the political cost-benefit calculation and thus the 
extent and direction of the political bias. As long as inefficient PPPs are realised for 
political reasons this can on the one hand be at the expense of the actual indicated 
public task fulfilment but also at the expense of efficient privatisation going unrealised.  
Economists are mainly interested in efficiency losses, which are motivated by this bias. 
Inefficiencies do not just occur because – according to the new political economy par-
adigm – the political process is regarded as a system of self-interest oriented individu-
als. Furthermore, agency theory and transaction cost theory show that as a result of 
power asymmetries even public agents who are oriented towards the common good 
make inefficient PPP contracts possible.  
Political scientists, on the other hand, are interested in changes in statehood, particular-
ly changes in the legitimation of decision-making about public tasks and the possibilities 
of democratic control. Here the PPP-mediated trade-off between  reduced  democratic 
control, but also reinforced market control, should be taken into account: The integra-Gawel: PPP – The role of political involvement    25 
tion of profit-oriented private interests and the increased realisation of user financing at 
least provide prospects for increasing the efficiency of state activities (cost efficiency 
and preference-orientation). Whether the traditional democratic control of the conven-
tional production of goods and services was able to guarantee a reliable link to voters’ 
interests is at least doubtful. Here participatory decision-making structures and constitu-
tional fiscal rules may offer a way out.  
Political involvement has a considerable influence on the extent, design and success of 
PPP solutions so it is important that influences of this type be included in the analysis. A 
broader perspective of the political and economic barriers that stand in the way of 
successful PPPs is now needed: A unifying framework that has yet to be developed 
might cope with public authorities’ (political) involvement in designing PPP arrange-
ments and could provide a more in-depth insight into political decision-making about 
public services.  
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